Greater Self-Assertion and Nationalism in Japan by Togo, Kazuhiko
Greater Self-Assertion 
and Nationalism in Japan 
Abstract 
Out of the deep spiritual vacuum from defeat in the Second World War, two 
fundamental rifts emerged in Japan. First, on the foreign policy front, the realism 
embraced by the conservative government was opposed by strong idealistic 
pacifism advocated by opposition parties and media, and this rift continued until 
the end of the Cold War. Second, with regard to the war in Asia, the Japanese 
gradually learned of atrocities committed, for which Japan owed an apology. 
However, views prevailing at the time to totally reject the past caused discomfort 
among many Japanese, and the issue of lost identity was left unanswered during 
the Cold War. When the Cold War ended, Japan began to move towards a more 
responsible and self-assertive security and defence policy. A series of initiatives 
toward clearer apology and reconciliation were confronted by a strengthened 
nationalism, and the issue of lost identity remained unresolved at the end of 
the 1990s. Koizumi has done well to implement a more responsible, proactive, 
realistic and self-assertive security and defence policy; moreover relations with 
the US have been considerably strengthened. But in East Asia, the issue of lost 
identity has reappeared and foreign policy towards Russia, Korea and China 
has resulted in a hardening of Japan's position in the region. Japan needs to have 
the courage to overcome this unresolved issue, while other countries' greater 
understanding of Japan's move toward a re-established identity will facilitate 
this process. Genuine dialogue is needed on all fronts. 
Introduction 
This paper aims to analyse two parallel foreign security policy directions 
which are emerging under Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, together 
with their historical background. On the one hand, Japan is becoming 
a more realistic, proactive, responsible and self-assertive country in 
regional and world affairs. For those who have long thought that Japan 
ought to assume a more prominent role to enhance regional and world 
peace and security, such changes are welcome. On the other hand, recent 
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events indicate that nationalistic thinking in search of identity has influ- 
enced and hardened important Japanese foreign policy decisions in East 
Asia, and that this will have a major impact in the coming decades. 
This paper argues that these two disparate policy directions share a 
common origin, and could be described as two stems growing from the 
same root. From the point of view of academic orientation, this analysis 
is based on the theory of international relations and takes account of all 
three major contemporary schools of thought: realism, liberalism and 
constructivism. The author considers that in order to understand the 
background to Koizumi's foreign policy, it is useful to adopt an eclectic 
approach to these three strands of thought. Recent eclectic analyses by 
Peter Katzenstein (2004: 1-33) and Thomas Berger (2000: 406-28) provide 
a good perspective. 
Japan's recent move to become a more realistic, responsible and self- 
assertive player in regional and global security affairs could be described 
as a shift from idealistic pacifism towards realism. Idealistic pacifism 
could be incorporated within the broad range of liberalism. The pursuit 
of liberal values (democracy and freedom) in the domestic policy, efforts 
to achieve economic development via the free flow of goods and services, 
and reliance on world politics to maintain a state of global peace (Doyle 
1997: 210,302-6) all reflect typical post-war Japanese liberal thinking, with 
the caveat that extreme passivity in post-war Japanese idealistic pacifism 
(vis-a-vis its own security and global peace) should also be noted. 
Realism can be understood in the traditional sense that the world is 
composed of power-motivated states, that relations between states are 
conditioned by the competition for power, and that peace and security 
are preserved through a balance of power. Hans Morgenthau's defini- 
tion of realism as 'the concept of interest defined in terms of power' 
(Morgenthau and Thompson 1948: 5) is still instructive in this regard. 
Japan's realization that it should become more proactive, assertive and 
responsible signifies its shift towards realism. 
This paper does not intend to focus on the degree of the change oc- 
curring in Japan's policies from liberalism to realism. Although that is 
an important subject for debate, the author considers that an analysis 
restricted to the liberal-realist dichotomy does not fully explain Ja- 
pan's recent drift towards nationalism. In the contemporary theory of 
international relations, constructivism would seem to bring us clos- 
est to the truth. Constructivism here is understood, largely based on 
Alexander Wendt's (1994: 385) theory, as highlighting 'identity' as a key 
determinant of a state's behaviour. A country's definition of its national 
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interests depends on how its identity is constructed. Constructivism 
also underscores the intersubjectivity of identity: 'actors learn identities 
and interests as a result of how significant others treat them' (Wendt 
1999: 171).l This paper puts its emphasis on the historical formation 
of identity in Japan. Intersubjective development in conjunction with 
such actors as China, Korea or Russia is not accentuated in this paper. 
Though highly significant, the author considers that given the con- 
straints of space, Japan's identity analysis in its historic and domestic 
context should take precedence over intersubjective analysis of outside 
actors. Thus, historical analysis dating back to the post-Second World 
War period, together with contemporary political analysis composed of 
psychological, cultural, political, economic and other factors, constitute 
this paper's principal analytical tools. 
The Impact of Defeat in the Second World War 
The impact of Japan's defeat in the Second World War on the national 
psyche was immeasurable. Japan as a nation had been defeated and 
occupied for the first time in its entire history. In national memory, 
there were only three occasions when Japan fought wars against out- 
side forces. In the 12th century, Japan was attacked by the Mongolian 
Empire, whose fleets were destroyed by a hurricane, called kamikaze. 
In the 16th century, Hideyoshi Toyotomi invaded Korea, where his 
army was defeated. While this was technically a defeat, the episode is 
usually remembered as an unsuccessful operation by an omnipotent 
ruler. After the Meiji Restoration in 1868, Japan achieved, for the most 
part,2 continuous victories. 
Thus for the majority of the Japanese people, the shock incurred by 
defeat in the Second World War was so great that they became engulfed 
in a huge spiritual vacuum. John Dower discusses vividly this state of 
'spiritual vacuum' in his book Embracing Defeat (Dower 1999: 87-121). 
Defeat in war also meant the end of the values that had led to war. But 
the majority of the population had little opportunity to analyse and 
reflect upon the significance of the events which had set Japan on the 
path to war and defeat. 
Externally, Japan was occupied by the United  state^.^ The initial 
Allied policy was to demilitarize and democratize Japan. Idealism 
governed initial US policy - to turn Japan into a peaceful, democratic, 
middle-scale economic power (Murata R. 2002: 19). American directives 
informed the new Constitution which was promulgated in November 
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1946. In particular, Article 9, which stated that: 'the Japanese people 
forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation as means of 
settling international disputes' was thought to be the work of General 
Douglas MacArthur." 
US occupation also brought to light many of the atrocities committed 
by Japan during the war, particularly after the Manchurian incident in 
1931. Japan's war responsibility was heavily engraved from early in US 
occupation and through the International Military Tribunal of the Far 
East (IMTFE) (May 1946 to November 1948). The 1951 San Francisco 
Peace Treaty obligated Japan to 'indemnify those who suffered undue 
hardships while prisoners of war of Japan (Article 16)'. For the majority 
of Japanese, those revelations were new, and some of them were shock- 
ing. A dawning realization of Japan's culpability for its actions during 
the Second World spread in the spiritual vacuum of post-war Japan. 
Many post-war intellectuals and the mass media followed this line. 
Thus Japan's pacifism under Article 9 of the Constitution and Japan's 
negation of all pre-war activities began to dominate immediate post- 
war thinking in Japan. This way of thinking had its merits, but also its 
limitations, which began to emerge in the next stage of Japan's history: 
the Cold War. 
Cold War Years: the Rift between 
Realists and Passive Idealists 
The initial period of the occupation which was characterized by idealistic 
pacifism did not last long. The Cold War began in Europe, almost before 
the Second World War had ended, and descended on East Asia in 1947: 
Korea's formal split in 1948, the civil war in China, the establishment 
of the People's Republic of China and the relocation of the Republic of 
China (Taiwan) in 1949, were followed by the Korean War and Chinese 
intervention in 1950. 
In the Cold War environment, the initial post-war US policy towards 
Japan was transformed. From early 1948, Japan became a regional 
bulwark of the democratic camp. A policy of 'partial peace' establish- 
ing diplomatic relations with democratic countries took shape; close 
security ties with the United States became essential; Japan was urged 
to rebuild minimum security forces; and an economic policy to enhance 
reconstruction and economic recovery was in t r~duced .~  
Japan's reaction was complex. The government, under the conserva- 
tive leadership of Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, basically welcomed 
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and implemented these policies. Yoshida's objective was to rebuild the 
economy, while ensuring Japan's security through its ties with the US. 
It was a realistic and responsible policy for the time. A peace treaty, 
together with a security treaty with the United States, was thereby con- 
cluded in September 1951. Symbolic security forces were established, 
which later became the Self-Defence Forces (SDF).6 
Inside Japan, idealistic pacifism deriving from the immediate post-war 
period was in full swing, supported by leftist political forces, the social- 
ist and communist parties, labour unions, influential intellectuals and 
public opinion, as well as the media. On the other hand, the conservative 
parties and a minority of intellectuals espoused the government's real- 
ism. Thus under the Cold War iron umbrella of US-Soviet rivalry, the 
first deep contradiction in Japan's foreign security policy emerged as a 
rift between realists and passive pacifists. The conservative government 
led by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) established itself in 1955, with 
the creation of the so-called 'coalition of conservatives'.' But the opposi- 
tion led by the Socialist Party and backed by media-led public opinion 
was no less influential, particularly in parliamentary debates. The rift 
between the two camps continued for almost four decades. 
This does not mean, however, that important proactive and self-asser- 
tive initiatives were not undertaken during this time, but they were al- 
ways accompanied by the political struggle between realists and pacifist 
idealists. In 1960 the Japan-US Security Treaty was revised to place the 
two countries on a more equal footing. This revision met with mass 
protest, which feared Japan would become entangled in US-led wars. 
In 1969, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and President Nixon agreed on 
the basic principles for the reversion of Okinawa. The key issue was 
whether nuclear weapons, in an emergency, would be allowed to re- 
enter Okinawa. Public opinion was totally against re-entry. Given this 
reality, Sato announced publicly that nuclear weapons would never be 
allowed, although a secret agreement with the US allegedly promised 
otherwise. Okinawa was returned to Japan in 1972. 
Cold War Years: Japan's Identity Issue 
The second issue emerging from Japan's deep spiritual vacuum from its 
defeat in the Second World War concerned the nation's responsibility 
for pre-war activities. This is an issue deeply related to Japan's identity: 
what was Japan before and after the war? What brought Japan to the 
war? What was right and what was wrong in Japan's pre-war deeds? 
How should this issue be related to post-war Japan's diplomacy? 
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As stated earlier, the initial years of occupation brought about a 
new recognition of the negative aspects of Japan's pre-war activities, 
which was strongly shared by post-war intellectuals and the media. 
Masao Maruyama championed those anti-militarist views. His thinking 
identified a unique and structural cause in pre-war Japanese state and 
society that had precipitated Japan to ultra or extreme nationalism, as 
manifested in the tract Chokokkashugi no Ronrito Shinri (The Logic and 
Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism) written in 1946 (Maruyama 1964: 11- 
28). This became an enduring banner for post-war Japanese intellectuals. 
Saburo Ienaga, who waged a lone court case from 1965 against Japanese 
textbooks that failed to adequately address Japan's responsibility and 
atrocities during the war, also became a symbol of consciousness of 
many intellectuals during the Cold War period (Togo 2005: 142). 
At the same time, there emerged another type of post-war conscious- 
ness, rarely supported by the media majority. This constituted an effort 
to understand and re-state Japan's position from the perspective of the 
erstwhile top Japanese leadership at the time of the war. This historical 
narrative was prominently on display at the time of the IMFTE trials, 
for example, by Shigenori Togo, foreign minister of Japan in the Tojo 
and Suzuki Cabinets, who did everything he could to prevent the war 
from happening (and failed) and everything he could to end the war 
(and s~cceeded) .~  
While confused, the people of Japan gradually developed an under- 
standing that Japan owed an apology for its atrocities and wrong-doings 
during the war, particularly towards its Asian neighbours. At the same 
time, simply to negate all its pre-war past because of this regrettable 
aspect, left feelings of unease among those Japanese who thought that 
many of their soldiers had conducted themselves with honour, in the 
belief that they were fighting for the right cause for Japan and Asia. 
Positions began to diverge among Japanese intellectuals, government 
agencies, political forces and public opinion generally. 
However, this divergence regarding Japan's past and its identity did 
not really come to the forefront of foreign policy during this Cold War 
period. In other words, protected under the Cold War iron umbrella, 
Japan itself never succeeded in resolving this inner contradiction to come 
up with a reasonably clear national consensus about what was wrong 
and what was right regarding its past and to elucidate and re-establish its 
identity. Thomas Berger writes an interesting analysis that 'the relative 
looseness of the US-led coalition, the paucity of democracies in the 
region, and the deep divisions among the Communist nations in Asia' 
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contributed to this issue failing to come to the forefront of Japan-Asia 
relations (Berger 2003: 60). 
At any rate, the Japanese government went through war crime tri- 
bunals, paid reparations and related funds for economic co-operation, 
and settled claims with foreign governments, in the belief that through 
this process, it was fulfilling all the victors' requirements. Through the 
1960s and 1970s, when Japan resumed relations with Korea and China, 
the issue of war responsibility was heatedly discussed, but was resolved 
with the key expression of Japan's expression of 'deep remorse' (Togo 
2005: 129, 159). The decade of the 1980s marked the start of China's 
policy of 'reform and opening' and Korea's rapid economic growth 
(leading to the Seoul Olympics in 1988). During this period economic 
ties between Japan and these two countries strengthened remarkably. 
But historical issues reappeared in the form of controversial textbooks 
(1982), official visits to the Yasukuni Shrine (1985), and contentious 
statements by a number of Japanese politicians. On the surface, these 
issues were resolved through the revision of textbooks to excise and/ 
or modify offending sections, the discontinuation of official Yasukuni 
visits, and the resignation of the outspoken politicians from their of- 
ficial positions. These case-by-case solutions, however, did not resolve 
the fundamentals of the identity issue for Japan: 'What was wrong and 
what was right in pre-war Japan?' 
Post-Cold War: From Idealistic Pacifism towards Realism 
The end of the Cold War had an enormous impact on Japanese foreign 
and security policy. The iron umbrella, which had protected Japan for 
40 years, disappeared. Japan became more directly exposed to the harsh 
reality of international politics. 
The Gulf War of 1990-91 was the first 'post-Cold War' shock for Japan. 
Japan mobilized a total of $13 billion in economic assistance, but was un- 
able to contribute personnel. America perceived that Japan was willing 
to share the financial burden of the war, without sharing the human 
risks of putting its young men and women in harm's way. Japan's efforts 
went naturally unappreciated by the international community. Michael 
Green writes about 'shockingly little gratitude for Japan's $13 billion to 
support the Gulf War' and that the 'war was a colossal diplomatic failure 
for Japan' (Green 2001a: 24). The derision that met Japan ensured that 
the first Gulf War would be remembered as 'Japan's defeat in 1991'.9 
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The second shock occurred in East Asia. The 1993-94 North Korean 
nuclear crisis brought East Asia to the brink of war. The crisis was settled 
through a framework agreed by the US and North Korea, but it made 
US and Japanese defence officials realize that, should a crisis break out 
on the Korean Peninsula, Japan, lacking the necessary legal basis, would 
be unprepared to co-operate with US troops. Yoichi Funabashi gives 
a detailed account of how the officials on both sides shared a common 
concern about Japan's inability to respond to a crisis situation on the 
Korean Peninsula (Funabashi 1997: 310-21). 
The third shock in 1995-96 took place in the Taiwan Strait, when China 
exercised missile-launching across the Strait in the months preceding 
Taiwan's election.1° Although tensions cooled after America sent two 
carriers to the Strait, a sense of crisis inevitably shook Japan. 
Internal changes in Japan's power structure were equally dramatic. 
From 1992 to the summer of 1993, several reformist politicians left the 
LDP to form new parties.ll In August 1993 the LDP lost at the polls for 
the first time since 1955, and a coalition of eight parties headed by Prime 
Minister Morihiro Hosokawa took power. One year later, in June 1994, 
the LDP returned to power in a most unthinkable coalition with its 
Cold War arch-enemy, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), led by Tomiichi 
Murayama, who became prime minister. Murayama acknowledged the 
SDF as constitutional, and the Japan-US Security Treaty as admissible. 
The JSP, known for so many decades as the protector of Article 9, had to 
acknowledge post-Cold War reality. This recognition of reality crushed 
the Socialists' raison d'gtre. 
In January 1996 the LDP dissolved its coalition with the JSP and Ryu- 
taro Hashimoto became prime minister. In September 1996, the newly 
formed Democratic Party became the main opposition. The Democratic 
Party is a coalition of politicians with wide-ranging views on security 
but which is, on the whole, ready to recognize Japan's more active and 
responsible participation in regional and global security matters. 
Thus through the 1990s the external shift from the Cold War to the 
post-Cold War era and corresponding internal political changes resulted 
in a more realistic, proactive, responsible and self-assertive Japanese for- 
eign security policy. Two examples highlight this change. First, 'Japan's 
defeat in 1991' made the leadership think seriously about remedying 
the situation.12 In September 1991 a new bill was presented to the Diet; 
the International Peace Co-operation Law was approved in June 1992. 
The new law became the legal basis for the SDF to participate in United 
Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations. 
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The enactment of the International Peace Co-operation Law created 
the basis for Japan to participate in the UN peacekeeping mission in 
Cambodia (UNTAC), which began its work in March 1992. From Sep- 
tember 1992, Japan participated in UNTAC.13 Japan's engagement in the 
East Timor crisis was slow to begin, as the law allowed the SDF to be 
dispatched only after a ceasefire had been signed.l"rom the enactment 
of the new law in 1992 to the summer of 2003, Japan sent 17 missions: 
eight UN peacekeeping operations, four for humanitarian relief and 
five for election monitoring.15 
Second, Japan took a series of proactive measures to counter tensions in 
Northeast Asia. After the 1993-94 Korean nuclear crisis, intense efforts at 
co-ordination began between Japanese and US defence experts. Thomas 
Berger writes that 'after the near debacle in Korea, the two governments 
were finally galvanized into action', which led to series of agreements in 
the latter part of the 1990s (Berger 2004: 146). The US Department of De- 
fense published its report East Asian Strategic Review (EASR) in February 
1995, which proclaimed the US intent to maintain approximately 100,000 
troops in Asia. In November 1995, the Murayama Cabinet adopted a 
National Defence Program Outline (NDPO)16 which reconfirmed the 
importance of post-Cold War Japan-US security relations and extended 
SDF involvement to areas such as participation in international peace- 
keeping and large-scale disaster relief (Green 2001a: 75-79). 
The efforts of the two administrations culminated in 1996. In April, 
upon President William J. Clinton's visit to Tokyo, The Japan-US Joint 
Declaration on  Security: Alliance for the 2 lS t  Century1' was adopted. The 
document reaffirmed the Japan-US security relationship as the cor- 
nerstone for maintaining a stable and prosperous Asia-Pacific region, 
and announced the review of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-US Defense 
Cooperation. Whereas the 1978 Guidelines had primarily addressed, 
under Article 5 of the Security Treaty, co-operation between the two 
governments in the event of Japan being attacked, the new Guidelines 
were a response to the 1993-94 North Korean nuclear crisis, when a 
US-North Korea clash without a direct attack on Japan could be envis- 
aged, although geographical definitions were carefully avoided. 
The review of the Guidelines took nearly one year. Yoichi Funabashi 
describes how leading Japanese officials like Hitoshi Tanaka (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs - MOFA) and Takeaki Moriya (Japan Defence 
Agency- JDA) proactively led the negotiations to establish 'an equal 
partner relations not in words but in deeds' (Funabashi 1997: 492). New 
Guidelines for defence co-operation were adopted in September 1997. It 
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took nearly another year for Japan to prepare the necessary legislation 
to implement them, and after full parliamentary debate in the spring of 
1999, The Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security in Situa- 
tions in Areas Surrounding Japan was adopted in May 1999. 
Post-Cold War: From Enhanced Apology 
to Rising Nationalist Sentiment 
The end of the Cold War also deeply affected Japan's position on its 
history. Out of the unresolved issue from 1945 on 'what was wrong and 
what was right', a series of concrete measures to express an apology 
were taken in the wake of the Cold War. It is worth considering why, 
during the first half of the 1990s, the Japanese government became more 
forthcoming in expressing such an apology, and in the second half of the 
1990s, in seeking reconciliation with related countries. First, the lifting of 
the Cold War iron umbrella might have forced these unresolved issues 
more to the forefront of international relations and Japan had to react to 
this reality. Or perhaps the watershed of 50 years since the end of the war 
brought a sense of a time limit, whereby things needed to be resolved in 
a more definite manner. But then, why more towards reconciliation? 
The end of the Cold War brought into the Japanese government those 
politicians whose thinking was more inclined towards a straightforward 
apology. Prime Minister Hosokawa (1993-94), who represented the 
first non-LDP reformist government and Murayama (1994-96), a so- 
cialist Prime Minister, both had political backgrounds that favoured a 
straightforward apology. Hosokawa and Murayama, Miyazawa (1991- 
93), and Kono as his chief cabinet secretary, were leading thinkers in 
the LDP seeking reconciliation with Asia, and Hashimoto (1996-98) and 
Obuchi (1998-2000) belonged to the Tanaka faction, whose basic policy 
was to give priority to Japan-China relations. 
Thus the Asian Womens Fund was established in the period from 
the Miyazawa Cabinet to the Murayama Cabinet specifically to pay 
atonement money together with a written apology to 'comfort women'.18 
Prime ministers such as Miyazawa,19 HosokawaZO and MurayamaZ1 were 
particularly forthright in expressing their apology in this period. And 
the major historic statement of apology was made by Prime Minister 
Murayama on 15 August 1995, expressing his 'deep remorse and heartfelt 
apology'. Due to the polemical situation which occurred in relation to the 
Diet resolution adopted in August 1995, the importance of that statement 
is sometimes overlooked. Thomas Berger gives a lively description how 
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the Diet Resolution was debated and adopted in a confused situation 
(Berger 2003: 80). But despite this confusion, the Murayama Statement, 
as agreed by a Cabinet decision, became the basis of government policies 
of apology since 1995 to date. The key paragraph of the statement reads 
as follows: 
During a certain period in the not too distant past, Japan, following a 
mistaken national policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare 
the Japanese people in a fateful crisis, and, through its colonial rule and 
aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of 
many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. In the hope that no 
such mistake be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these 
irrefutable facts of history, and express here once again my feelings of deep 
remorse and state my heartfelt apology. Allow me also to express my feelings 
of profound mourning for all victims, both at home and abroad, of that history. 
(Togo 2005: 170-1) 
The Murayama Statement became the basis for reconciliation between 
Japan and Great Britain in January 1998, South Korea in October 
1998, and the Netherlands in February 2000 (Togo 2005: 171-5,282-5). 
Thomas Berger also gives a vivid description as to how the Japan-Korea 
reconciliation was achieved in 1998 (Berger 2003: 80). 
Furthermore, Japan's 'engagement' policy towards China in the face 
of its 'reform and opening' was manifested by the launching of massive 
ODA from 1979 (Nakanishi 2001: 176). Moreover, Japan expressed a 
strong appeal to the international community not to isolate China after 
the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 (Murata, K. 2001: 221,228), which 
enhanced their relations. As a culmination of this friendly relationship, 
the imperial visit took place in 1992. It is also noted that the Ienaga trial 
was concluded in 1997 at the Supreme Court, which has brought justice 
to many of Ienaga's view on history (Togo 2005: 142). 
This mood of general optimism changed sometime in the mid-1990s. 
Particularly in relation to China, the climate of genuine reconciliation 
rapidly began to wane. Japan's expectation that the Chinese leadership 
would begin looking to the future rather than harking back to the past 
proved to be illusory. In 1995, at the time Murayama was making his 
historic statement expressing 'deep remorse and heartfelt apology', a 
campaign began all over China displaying pictures of the Nanjing Mas- 
sacre in primary schools. Even pro-Chinese MOFA officials were des- 
perate (Funabashi 2003: 59). The Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995-96, nuclear 
tests in 1995-96 (Green 2001b: 80-2), the Senkaku Islands issue (Green 
2001b: 82-8), and perceived arrogance by Jiang Zemin in 'preaching to 
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Japan on past sins' in 1998, all combined in the latter part of the 1990s 
to heighten tensions between the two countries. 
Coinciding with this rising tension with China, those scholars and 
intellectuals who considered that Japan's affirmation of its honour 
and identity must play a central role in its internal and external policy 
became more vocal than ever. There are at least three beliefs common 
to thinkers in this group: (i) that much greater approval should be given 
to pre-Second World War Japan; (ii) that the post-war US occupation 
and the IMTFE destroyed Japan's honour and self-esteem and that these 
needed to be re-established urgently; (iii) that those atrocities that had 
been committed by Japan before the war had already been compensated 
in full by war tribunals and treaty obligations. 
In December 1996, these scholars and intellectuals established a forum 
for a 'new history textbook'. In 1998, Yoshinori Kobayashi, a leading 
writer of the 'new history textbook' forum and a popular cartoonist 
specializing in history, published his Sensoron [Theory of War], which 
comprised a full justification of Japan's cause in the Second World War. 
In 1999, Kanji Nishio, a leading historian belonging to the 'new history 
textbook' forum published Kokumin-no Rekishi [Nation's History] with 
the same flow of thinking. It may not be a coincidence that in 1999, 
Shintaro Ishihara, a popular politician whose political thinking is much 
in line with these scholars, was elected as governor of Tokyo. 
Why did this nationalistic trend became more visible in Japan's 
intellectual world? Professor Rikki Kersten in a public lecture held 
in 2003 stated that the successes of Saburo Ienaga in court became a 
powerful dialectical force that engendered its antithesis within nationalist 
thinking.22 It may well be so; that dialectic precisely represented Japan's 
search for identity. At any rate, the upsurge in nationalist thinking 
did not directly affect Japan's foreign policy until the end of the 1990s. 
However, at the turn of the new millennium the government leadership 
was assumed by a new prime minister, Junichiro Koizumi, and the 
issue of national identity began to assume more serious implications 
for Japanese foreign policy in East Asia. 
Domestic and Foreign Policies under 
Prime Minister Koizumi 
Junichiro Koizumi was elected prime minister in April 2001. Three fac- 
tors underlie the internal dynamics which brought him to power. First, 
dissatisfaction with the economy had been growing since the 1990s, in 
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large part due to the government's inability to address the aftermath of 
the bubble economy. Huge non-performing loans continued to negatively 
impact on the growth of the economy, while social problems, including 
high unemployment, proliferated. At the same time, the Japanese socio- 
economic structure, once hailed as the engine of growth, came under fire 
for its role in preserving an uncompetitive, inefficient and over-protected 
society. Koizumi was brought to power amidst expectations that he 
would lead the country out of these economic diffi~ulties.~~ 
Second, Koizumi was an LDP politician of long standing but was never 
at the helm of an LDP faction, which formed the traditional power base 
within the party. He was a striking but lone figure within the Abe-Mi- 
tsuzuka-Mori faction. Koizumi was, in large part, brought to office by 
his popularity among local LDP party members, who overwhelmingly 
voted for him at the time of the LDP presidential elections in April 2001. 
These local party members were attuned to the popular mood of the 
country, indeed, one may conclude that Koizumi's power base rests on 
the 'popular' vote. Hence Koizumi is said to be a populist, with a keen 
understanding of the mood of public opinion. It may be added that the 
importance of 'the voice of the people' emerged against the background 
of the weakening iron triangle of politicians, bureaucrats and business- 
men who presided over post-war Japanese economic de~elopment.~" 
Third, Koizumi, while a populist, is not a man who blindly follows 'the 
voice of the people'. He seems to have a selective political agenda, con- 
troversial in some cases, from which he does not retreat. His insistence 
on the need for reforming the postal services, his conviction that nothing 
should prevent Japan from 'acting responsibly' on defence and security 
matters, his determination to visit the Yasukuni Shrine to pay homage 
to the war dead: these show that he is not blindly bowing to fluctuating 
opinion polls. He may be convinced that his views correspond to what 
his era requires of him, ultimately to what the Japanese people expect. 
Externally, the greatest challenges Koizumi had to face were 9/11, the 
war in Iraq and the North Korean threat. Koizumi's preoccupation with 
these security/foreign policy challenges at times overshadowed his 
primary task of socio-economic reform. 
Without doubt, 9/11 in 2001 was the single major incident which 
shook the world after the end of the Cold War. The impact of 9/11 was 
so far-reaching that many international relations analysts maintain 
that the post-Cold War era has been replaced by a new era of the war 
against terrorism. All countries have had to take a position and Japan 
is no exception. President Bush waged war against Saddam Hussein 
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in March-April 2003, as an extension of the war on global terrorism. 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and links with A1 Qaeda were 
originally identified as the primary motives to dismantle Saddam's 
regime. Japan, alongside other major countries, had to take a stance. 
For Japan, an additional threat it had to face at the threshold of the 
21st century emanated from North Korea. The DPRK became one of the 
most militaristic, totalitarian and oppressive regimes in the world dur- 
ing the Cold War. When it ended, the country emerged as the sole loser 
in East Asia. In order to consolidate power, North Korea has pursued a 
zig-zag between hard-line policies, including the worst kind of terrorist 
activities, and conciliatory behaviour, particularly addressed to South 
Korea. After the end of the Cold War, Japan responded to North Ko- 
rean overtures. Aiming to establish diplomatic relations, Japan shipped 
humanitarian food aid, which brought three periods of relative quiet.25 
But each period was followed by rising tension.26 
Against this background, Koizumi's visit to Pyongyang in September 
2002 ended with a series of seemingly remarkable successes. By then, the 
abduction issue had become foremost for the Japanese public. In the late 
1970s at least a dozen Japanese citizens had been abducted by North Ko- 
rea.27 Kim Jong I1 acknowledged the fact, apologized, and promised that 
it would never happen again - a gesture nobody anticipated. Regarding 
the unidentified vessels encroaching upon Japanese territorial waters,28 
Kim Jong I1 stated that he had had no previous knowledge of the issue 
but had recently begun investigations, promising that such incursions 
would cease. Regarding nuclear weapons and missiles, North Korea in 
principle agreed in the Pyongyang Joint De~lara t ion~~ to comply with all 
related international agreements. The ground for re-opening negotia- 
tions to establish diplomatic relations appeared to be there, however it 
soon collapsed. The fact that eight out of the thirteen abductees were 
dead, a fact acknowledged by North Korea, shocked many Japanese. 
Japanese public opinion exploded in indignation against North Korea. 
The nuclear crisis which erupted in October 2002 was the final blow in 
cementing the Japanese perception of threat from North Korea. 
Security Policy and US Relations: Greater 
Self-Assertion Based on Realism 
As the greatest challenges Koizumi had to face in external relations were 
the war against global terrorism and North Korea, his foreign policy 
was heavily oriented towards defence and security matters. Koizumi's 
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reaction was, in general, realistic, proactive, responsible and self-asser- 
tive. Five reasons account for his position. 
First and foremost, we need to go back to the historical context. After 
four decades of strife between realists and pacifist idealists, Japanese 
increasingly found it more natural and comfortable to become a normal 
partner within the international community, sharing responsibility and 
participating in matters affecting global and regional peace and security. 
Koizumi, based on his intuitive understanding of popular opinion, took 
a series of proactive decisions. Some decisions, particularly relating to 
the war in Iraq, were controversial. Public opinion has been split, but 
thus far, Koizumi's decisions have not seriously undermined his basic 
popularity. In accordance with an Asahi Shinbun (AS) poll, Koizumi's 
rating which peaked at 78 percent in April 2001 (AS, 30 April 2001), 
declined to its lowest level of 38 percent in June 2002 (AS, 22 March 
2003), because of internal political reasons. It rose slightly to 44 percent 
in February 2003 (AS, 25 February 2003), and dropped back to 42 percent 
only after Koizumi's open support of President Bush in March 2003 (AS, 
22 March 2003).30 
Second, ironically, it was the asymmetry that dominated the Cold War 
security environment that triggered Japan's proactive decision-making. 
Article 9 of the Constitution grants Japan the right to exercise minimal 
self-defence, but not the right of collective self-defence as granted by the 
UN Charter. Article 5 of the Security Treaty, on the other hand, obligates 
the US to defend Japan if it is attacked by outside forces. The Article is 
written in such a way as to exempt Japan in an equivalent ~ i t ua t i on .~~  
Abductions and North Korea's nuclear capabilities compelled the Japa- 
nese to take note of the security threat surrounding the country. The 
realization that Japanese security was ultimately dependent upon the 
United States, based on the above-mentioned asymmetry, underpinned 
Koizumi's decision to opt for responsible and self-assertive measures. 
Japan's position converged with President Bush's position in favour of 
further proactive engagement from Japan. 
Third, Japan's economic crisis during the 1990s may have made the 
country more sensitive to its political role. Frustration emerging from 
economic failure translated into a desire to fulfil a greater political 
role. Declining economic power also deprived Japan of its once mighty 
cheque-book diplomacy. Contributions in the political arena may have 
become an alternative way for Japan to stay active in the arena of inter- 
national peace and security. 
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Fourth, as previously discussed, from the spiritual vacuum in the 
summer of 1945 emerged two fundamental issues in post-war Japan: 
the nation's security role and its identity. Japan's greater role in its own 
defence and security, and its search for a more realistic, responsible and 
self-assertive role are certainly in line with the growing nationalism in 
search of clearer identity and greater self-esteem. Michael Armacost 
identifies this linkage between nationalism and Japan's readiness to 
play a greater security role (Armacost 2003: 102). 
Fifth and finally, Japan's younger generation, which does not have 
any recollection of post-war hardship, let alone of the war itself, is in- 
creasingly supportive of Japan playing a greater role in matters related 
to global issues of peace and security. It is natural that Japan's greater 
self-assertion be supported by some of the older generation, whose 
sense of national pride has long been hurt by the post-war ascendancy 
of idealistic pacifism. But among the younger generation as well, Japan 
behaving normally without particular inhibition from the past is gain- 
ing new support. 
Post 9/11 
In contrast to the slow reaction of the past, Koizumi announced on 19 
September Japan's decision to react to the terrorist attack on 9/11. Japan 
took the attack as 'Japan's own security issue'32- a clear and unambigu- 
ous message of support for joint action by the international community. 
Three weeks later, the government presented the Anti-Terrorism Special 
Measures Bill to the Diet. The essence of the bill was to send the SDF to 
provide rear-action support in the war against international terrorism. By 
the end of October, the bill had been approved in the Diet.33Eric Hegin- 
botham and Richard Samuels give a very positive evaluation concerning 
Koizumi's initial reaction (Heginbotham and Samuels 2002: 101-2). 
The changes of the 1990s had prepared the Japanese people for this 
de~eloprnent.~"y the end of 2001, based on the Basic Plan adopted 
in November, five ships, eight aircraft and 1,380 troops (Saga Shinbun 
Kyodo, 17 November 2001) were in action, supplying fuel to American 
and British vessels in the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea engaged in 
combat activities against international terrorism in Afghanistan. Aircraft 
were engaged in transport between American bases in Japan and the 
Guam Islands (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 7 November 2002). 
Politicians, intellectuals, and public opinion in general were sup- 
portive of Koizumi's decision. Among the major newspapers, Mainichi 
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Shinbun did not support Japan's involvement, and such an influential 
politician as Nonaka voiced a message of caution (Heginbotham and 
Samuels 2002: 102-3). But they were not in the majority. Among the 
'nationalist' camp, Yoshinori Kobayashi was conspicuous in justifying 
the terrorists' cause against the US, but he was in a minority (Kobayashi 
2001: 9-32). 
War in Iraq in 2003 
When President Bush decided to disarm Saddam Hussein in the summer 
of 2002, public opinion in Japan, as in many countries in Europe and 
around the world, was against a pre-emptive attack. From the outset, 
Koizumi seems to have been determined that Japan would ultimately 
support the US. However, he believed that disarming Saddam would 
be more effective were he declared an enemy of the community of na- 
tions, and not only of the United States. Thus from the summer of 2002 
to the winter of 2003, Japan advised the United States, discreetly, to go 
through the United Nations. At the Japan-US strategic talks in August 
2002, the vice minister for foreign affairs Takeuchi said to deputy secre- 
tary Armitage that 'The US should create a structure of Iraq versus the 
international community, and not Iraq versus the United States. The UN 
Security Council will serve that purpose'. Armitage said proudly to the 
Japanese leadership in his visit to Tokyo at the end of the year that the 
US had fulfilled that Japanese request (AS, 10 December 2002). 
The United States did go through the United Nations, but from Feb- 
ruary to March 2003, failed to command the support of the Security 
Council. At this moment, when a deep rift appeared in the long-standing 
transatlantic alliance, Japan emerged as a clear supporter of President 
Bush's position. On 18 March 2003, only hours after President Bush sent 
an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein, Koizumi declared his open support for 
President Bush's decision. Public opinion was split, as were the editorials 
of the major newspapers: Yomiuvi and Sankei in support, Asahi and Mai- 
nichi against.35 However, Koizumi's ratings did not fall appreciably. 
After the fighting officially ended in Iraq, the Koizumi government 
presented a bill on 'Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruc- 
tion Assistance in Iraq' to the Diet, which was approved in July. Koizumi 
took a whole half year to prepare for the actual sending of Japanese 
troops. Finally, in January and February 2004, Japanese troops from the 
Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defence Forces (SDF) were stationed in 
Iraq, to be engaged in humanitarian and reconstruction activities (AS, 
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27 January 2004).36 In June 2004, Japan decided to join the multinational 
forces based on UN Resolution 1546, while preserving its right of com- 
mand (AS, 19 June 2004). At the October 2003 Madrid Conference, Japan 
committed $5 billion for the period 2004-07 to assist in the reconstruction 
of Iraq. It was the second largest contribution after the US'S $20 billion 
(AS, 25 October 2003). 
Koizumi's decision to support President Bush and send the SDF, and 
the timing of this, have been widely debated in Japan. Some criticized 
that Japan was just blindly following US interests and instructions. 
Nonetheless, given the Japanese security concerns described above, it 
was Japan's own security that demanded good relations with the United 
States, and as a final resort, the Japanese people were ready to accept 
Koizumi's support of President Bush. Questions remain however, as to 
whether Japan had pursued all alternative measures before Koizumi 
took the ultimate decision. Commentators have asked whether Japan 
could have pushed harder for a maximum role for the United Nations; 
whether Japan had fully explored dialogue with the Middle East and 
Europe; and ultimately whether Japan's dialogue was sufficiently hon- 
est in pointing out problems vis-a-vis the United States (Togo 2005: 
310). The situation in Iraq after its liberation was so problematic that it 
was unfortunate for Japan that this war became the test case to assess 
its determination to become a responsible and proactive partner in the 
community of nations. But given the internal logic, as described at the 
beginning of this section, ultimately the only wise choice for Koizumi 
was to send the SDF to Iraq. 
US reaction in academic analysis generally favours Japan's decision. 
Michael Armacost underlines the importance not 'to alienate the United 
States over Iraq at a time when [Japan] needed US support in dealing 
with a re-emerging threat in North Korea'. His analysis also indicates 
that Japan, with its political support and limited reconstruction and 
humanitarian participation, but nonetheless fulfilling the requirement 
of 'boots on the ground', evinced a positive reaction from the US and 
increased its chances for future involvement in a lucrative Iraqi oil deal 
(Armacost 2003: 91-3). Mike Mochizuki makes an interesting observation 
that 'new nationalism' does not necessarily explain Koizumi's backing 
of Bush's policy because nationalism could have been directed towards 
an independent position vis-a-vis the United States. Instead, Mochizuki 
points to the North Korean threat as a key factor, and also that Koizumi 
might gain much foreign policy leverage at relatively low political cost 
(Mochizuki 2004: 113-17). 
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Enactment of Laws in Response to an Armed Attack 
The threat from North Korea, in particular, resolved an issue which 
had dragged on from the 1970s: the enactment of laws to respond to 
armed attack. In 1977 the government began considering reform of the 
legal structure to allow for the country's defence if attacked by outside 
forces. But because of public reluctance to contemplate any war situa- 
tion, and because the Cold War rivalry between the United States and 
the Soviet Union rendered such a situation rather hypothetical, the issue 
was frozen for more than 20 years (AS, 7 June 2003). 
Following 9/11 and the heightening of the Japanese concern for 
security, Koizumi formulated three laws to addressing this issue, and 
presented them to the Diet in April 2002. The laws were approved by 
overwhelming majorities in the House of Representatives in May and 
in the House of Councillors in June.37 In April 2004 the government 
submitted to the Diet a second round of legislation-seven laws and 
three treaties. They were again approved by overwhelming majorities 
in the House of Representatives in May and in the House of Council- 
lors in June.38 
Growing SDF Capabilities 
The annual budget approved in spring 2004 included two items not easily 
dissociated from the perception of a growing threat from North Korea. 
One was missile defence: the amount of 142.3 billion ven was allocated 
for the deployment of surface-to-air missiles, one Patriot Advanced 
Capabilities3 (PAC3) missile around Tokyo, and one Standard Missile3 
(SM3) on an Aegis destroyer. The Defence Agency plans to deploy four 
PAC3s and four SM3s over the next four years. 
The second item in the budget was the request for 116.4 billion yen for 
a new type of escort ship, in reality a helicopter-carrier. This new type of 
escort ship is 16DDH, 13,500 tons, and 195 metres in length. The ship is 
designed to carry four large helicopters but has at least twice that capa- 
city. The MSDF is intending to equip two ships of this type, scheduled 
to be deployed in 2008 and 2009. The SDF explains that the purchase of 
this ship is necessary as 'long-term cooperative activities in the Indian 
Ocean, larger scale rescue operations, UN based PKO activities, transport 
of Japanese nationals at a time of emergency and other activities require 
large space and sufficient equipment' (AS, 30 August 2003). 
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Permanent Law to Deploy the SDF 
within Multinational Forces 
Experience with the 2001 anti-terrorism law and the 2003 Iraqi assist- 
ance law made the leadership think that a 'permanent law' enabling 
Japan to participate in multinational coalitions would be necessary. 
On 1 August 2003, a special task-force was established at the Cabinet 
Secretariat (AS, 3 August 2003). Numerous issues are awaiting political 
and legal deliberation, including the role of the United Nations, the use 
of weapons and the nature of multinational forces. 
As a prelude to these deliberations, in December 2002 a private advi- 
sory committee to the Cabinet General Secretary 'International Peace Co- 
operation Committee', under the chairmanship of Mr. Yasushi Akashi, 
former under-secretary general of the United Nations, formulated a 
report and presented it to the prime minister. It claimed that 'ten years 
of Japanese peacekeeping operations after the Cambodian involvement 
lagged far behind compared to other advanced countries'. The report 
advocated a new law to allow the SDF to participate in all multinational 
forces based on UN  resolution^^^ (AS, 19 December 2002). 
Japan-US relations 
Under the foreign policy of Koizumi's government, relations with the 
United States reached their post-war apex. Koizumi's realistic, proactive, 
responsible and self-assertive approach to deal with the threats of global 
terrorism and North Korea coincided with the US wish that Japan play 
a more proactive and responsible role in regional and global security 
matters. Naturally the Japan-US alliance was consolidated. Japanese 
public opinion generally supported Koizumi's policy. In facing exter- 
nal realpolitik after the Cold War, and following the internal logic from 
idealistic pacifism to realism, public opinion felt Koizumi's policy was 
proceeding in the right direction. 
One question needs to be raised: Is Japan supporting US policy on 
terrorism for the sake of Japan-US relations or for the sake of its own 
defence-security interests? My answer is clear: Japan's recent move 
toward a more proactive and self-assertive security policy derives 
fundamentally from its desire to fulfil its own national interests and 
responsibilities. This view suggests nothing provocative about the nature 
of Japan-US relations. Consolidation of Japan-US relations accords 
with Japan's geopolitical as well as global interests. This view is based 
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on historical analysis of 60 years of post-war Japanese history, and my 
observation as to how Japan has moved from the spiritual vacuum in 
1945 toward greater proactivity. 
Foreign Policy in East Asia: the Shadow of Nationalism 
Since Koizumi's East Asian foreign policy is such a wide, deep and 
complex issue, I restrict myself to covering North East Asia only and 
dwell on major events as they have unfolded up to the summer of 
2004. 
To set the context, it should be noted that economic and cultural 
relations with major East Asian countries, China, South Korea and 
Russia, are developing with a certain dynamism. One may argue that 
East Asia is relatively stable, in part because of the balance of power 
which favours the United States and Japan. Furthermore that China, 
while a rising power, does not come close to matching the combined 
resources of these two c~untries.~ '  Cultural relations with South Korea 
have been particularly rosy due to an unexpected flood of emotions on 
the part of Japanese housewives to a Korean movie-star. The response 
was a genuine expression of friendly feeling toward Korea, void of any 
historical memory. 
However, political relations with all countries are suffering. With 
Russia real difficulty is continuing with regard to the territorial issue. 
With South Korea, good progress in 2004 has almost been obliterated 
since March 2005 after a historic statement by President Roh Moo- 
Hyum, although this incident is outside the scope of this paper. North 
Korean relations are in stalemate because of the abduction issue, in 
addition to the nuclear one. Relations with China are deteriorating for 
many reasons, the historical legacy being one of the major factors. The 
anti-Japanese movement in China, which revealed itself in the spring 
of 2005 in a move against Japanese firms and merchandise, is beginning 
to affect the economic environment. 
Amidst all these issues which harden Japan's political relations, one 
common factor stands out: Japan's urge to redeem its 'lost identity'. This 
issue, which assumes a different shape in each bilateral relation, is the 
single common thread that emerges in all of all Japan's major foreign policy 
decisions in East Asia: toward Russia, Korea and China. Furthermore, 
regaining lost identity and self-esteem has been the central issue debated, 
particularly among 'nationalists', from the latter part of the 1990s. As of 
now, this 'nationalist movement' and foreign policy implementation in 
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East Asia are not directly linked and must be considered separately. And 
yet, the commonality here cannot be ignored. 
From the realpolitik point of view, given the power relations in East 
Asia around the ascendancy of China, it clearly is not in Japan's interest to 
clash with all surrounding countries. It is hard to fully comprehend this 
situation, if analysed only by the traditional realist-liberal approaches 
to international relations. This is why I referred to the constructivist 
approach. Alexander Wendt's emphasis on norms and identity seems 
to lend adequate theoretical scope and give some hope for the future. 
The way political relations are developing (or not developing) between 
Japan and North East Asian countries is worrisome, not only from the 
point of view of Japan's national interest, but also from the point of 
view of surrounding East Asian countries. The current status of politi- 
cal relations is not in the interest of any bilateral relations in the region. 
From Japan's perspective, there is an absolute need to grasp how and 
where this attachment to 'lost identity' may lead. From the viewpoint 
of outside countries, there is an equal imperative to understand Japan's 
behaviour and influence in order to see how it might be accommodated 
within the framework of their own policies and interests. Thomas Berger 
rightly observed that 'while by itself the historical issue is unlikely to 
lead to military conflict, it can have a serious corrosive impact on the 
region and is likely to hinder efforts to forge a stronger regional alliance' 
(Berger 2003: 84).'l 
Japan-Russia Relations 
The first occasion when the issue of lost identity appeared after Koi- 
zumi assumed office was his Russian policy. It took the form of Japan's 
fixation on 'lost honour'. Japan and Russia had been seriously engaged 
since the end of the 1980s in talks to settle a territorial dispute over 
four islands northeast of Hokkaido." Gorbachev visited Japan in 1991 
when his foreign policy agenda was practically accomplished and his 
political tenure was weak. The maximum concession he brought was 
a written statement that the four islands would remain the object for 
neg~t ia t ion .~~  
After the demise of the Soviet Union, President Yeltsin apparently 
launched in the spring of 1992 an unprecedented, confidential conces- 
sionary proposal, which was not accepted by Japan. This led to stagna- 
tion in negotiations until November 1997, when Yeltsin proposed the 
conclusion of a peace treaty by the year 2000. This was only achieved after 
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successful diplomatic approaches by Hashimoto to develop relations 
between the two countries on all fronts, including the establishment 
of personal relations between the top leaders. Japan then made its first 
concessionary proposal in April 1998, which seemed to have attracted 
President Yeltsin's attention, but Russia rejected this proposal." 
The first year under President Putin was probably the most promising 
period for negotiations: in March 2001 Russia acknowledged its obliga- 
tion under the 1956 Joint De~laration,'~ the possibility of discussing the 
real fate of the two larger islands almost emerged. But after Koizumi 
came to power in April, Japan's Russian policy disintegrated. The first 
reason for this disintegration was an internal political struggle based on 
personality and power. The key players were: Suzuki Muneo, a parlia- 
mentarian who strongly supported the prime minister Mori's Russian 
policy, but whose explosive character alienated many Foreign Ministry 
officials; Makiko Tanaka, foreign minister under Koizumi from April 
2001 to January 2002, who was extremely popular but distrusted by 
Foreign Ministry officials; and top bureaucrats and Russian specialists in 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The struggle resulted in Makiko Tanaka's 
resignation from the post of foreign minister and Muneo Suzuki's arrest 
for corruption. Whatever the intention of those involved, peace treaty 
negotiations collapsed after Koizumi took office in the spring of 2001, 
and any remaining hope vanished in the spring of 2002. 
Thus far, there has been little analysis in English about the state of 
negotiations in the first year under Putin, and the significance of its 
collapse thereafter. Gilbert Rozman's article stands out (Rozman 2002: 
337-52) and a short article of mine may be added (Togo 2004: 47-49). 
But in essence, the collapse of negotiations under Koizumi had deeper 
reasons than just personality and power struggle. Prime Minister Mori, 
supported by Muneo Suzuki, wanted to enter into real discussions over 
the two larger islands 'without preconditions'. But political forces who 
sought to undermine Suzuki asserted that negotiating 'without precon- 
ditions' may lead to a solution other than 'resolving the four islands 
issue as a group'. This hard-line approach- that only this position can 
protect Japan's request to return the four islands and ultimately redeem 
Japan's honour - gained support among Japanese politicians, opinion 
leaders and media. 
Four years have passed since Irkutsk. The year 2005 was recognized 
as the 150th anniversary of the conclusion of the Shimoda Treaty which 
initially demarcated the Russo-Japanese border. By Irkutsk, both sides 
were close to reaching a common understanding that out of the four 
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islands under negotiations, Habomai and Shikotan's status had been 
legally resolved in 1956; however, claims were divided regarding the 
sovereignty of Kunashiri and Etorofu, necessitating serious negotiations 
'without conditions'. If a possibility should present itself to resume the 
negotiations, Japan will have to weigh this situation seriously. Maintain- 
ing the demand for 'four islands as a group', will most likely simply stall 
the negotiations and lead to a stalemate. Accepting some compromise 
solution may not fully redeem Japan's honour, but Japan has to consider 
the other side's viewpoint and weigh up what, in the final analysis, it 
might conceivably be prepared to relinquish in order to resolve this 
long-standing issue. Judging its national interests based on a vealpolifik 
balance of power in East Asia is also necessary. 
At the time of the writing of this paper, there is no evidence that Japan 
is seriously considering a mutually acceptable solution. Nationalism and 
the association of national identity with territory seem to be blocking 
compromise. But should the situation arise where Japan is prepared 
to move away from seeking a full restoration of its lost honour, an 
equivalent compromise might be expected from the Russian side, so 
that both countries might maximize their attainable national interest. 
Japan-North Korea Relations 
After Koizumi's Pyongyang visit in September 2002, an opportunity pre- 
sented itself for intensive negotiations. The five survivors made what was 
planned as a temporary return visit to Japan from 15 October and were 
given a warm welcome under the spotlight of full media attention. But 
on 24 October, under pressure from family members of the abductees, 
the Japanese government decided not to return the five survivors to 
North Korea and to request the return of eight family members of the 
five abductees who remained in North Korea (AS, 25 October 2002). The 
decision was received positively in Japan, rapidly drawing strong support 
from public opinion. The five abductees eventually agreed to follow the 
government. Then and there, the people's search for 'justice' prevailed, 
and substantial talks between Japan and North Korea ended. 
When the US and North Korea deadlocked over the nuclear issue, 
and when six-party talks began in August 2003, Japan adopted the 
most stringent position among the five, together with the United States. 
China presided over the talks and Japan lost its slim opportunity to 
play a leading role in the negotiations. The fury of anti-North Korean 
feeling continued unabated in Japan. Even a description by a Japanese 
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scholar that 'Koizumi's visit to North Korea might have brought a 
historic opportunity for Japan to play a leadership role in the Korean 
Peninsula, but Japan's fixation on the abduction issue greatly limited that 
possibility' (Soeya 2004: 214) sounded fresh and somewhat audacious 
against near-uniformity in emotional criticism of the North. 
Against this backdrop, Japan's policy towards North Korea developed 
in several directions. First, Japan prepared concrete means to pressure 
North Korea through economic sanctions. A law to suspend currency 
transfers to North Korea was approved by the Diet on 9 February 2004 
(AS, 10 February 2004). Another law which empowered the government 
to forbid the entry of North Korean vessels engaged in various transac- 
tions between the two countries was approved by the Diet on 14 June 
2004 (AS, 15 June 2004). 
Second, Japan participated enthusiastically in the six-party talks held 
in February and June 2004. The content of the negotiations has been kept 
confidential, but informed sources are suggesting that Japan is trying 
its best to find an avenue to bring about a realistic solution, despite its 
hard-line facade? 
Third, on 22 May 2004 Koizumi revisited Pyongyang, led five out 
of eight abductees family members back to Japan, and agreed to find 
a location (later Indonesia was chosen) for the remaining three to be 
reunited with Mrs. Soga, who was the fifth abductee." North Korea 
agreed to further investigate the fate of ten outstanding abductee~,'~ 
and listened to Koizumi reiterate that all nuclear weapons should be 
dismantled. Japan agreed to humanitarian assistance via international 
organizations: 250,000 tons of food aid and $10 million of medical aid 
(AS, 23 May 2004). Koizumi overcame a further emotional upsurge 
of public feeling in Japan, including an explosive outcry by the five 
who had returned to Japan regarding a delay in the reunion with their 
children. This trip might have brought the relationship back to the point 
of September 2002. 
Japan needs to find a way to achieve both objectives: resolving the 
abduction issue and achieving the denuclearization of North Korea. 
Mike Mochizuki also concludes that Koizumi's partial liberation from 
a fixation on the abduction issue may open up an opportunity for Ja- 
pan to play a more effective role in the six-party talks (Mochizuki 2004: 
118-20). However, treating the abduction issue as a high priority is 
unavoidable. It signifies something more important than the legitimate 
anger of the families. A great number of the Japanese people are 
satisfied to see that, after so many years of neglect, the state is finally 
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fulfilling its responsibility in its search for 'justice'. At the same time 
though, this agenda should be placed within the framework of Japan's 
overall objectives towards North Korea. It should be implemented 
in parallel with Japan's maximum contribution to the six-party talks, 
which tackle the denuclearization issue. After all, this issue is vital 
for Japan's own security. Also, six-party talks might become a basis 
for regional multilateralism in the future. In this context, dialogue, 
pressure, inducement and sanctions must be finely balanced in the most 
appropriate manner. Finally, it should not be forgotten that Japan's 
long-term policy objective is to achieve a normalization of relations with 
North Korea. Understanding and encouragement by the international 
community of Japan's multiple objectives would naturally assist Japan 
in this endeavour. 
China and Taiwan 
In order to place Sino-Japanese relations in a proper perspective, it 
may be useful to analyse the economic relations that existed prior to 
Koizumi's term of office. After the establishment of diplomatic relations 
in 1972, it is generally thought that Sino-Japanese economic relations 
developed smoothly. The sharp rise in trade figures exemplifies this 
trend (see Table 1). 
For the year 2003, Japan's trade with China amounted to $132.4 billion; 
its trade with the US totalled $174.1 billion; with the EU $124.8 billion; 
and with ASEAN it totalled $119.3 billi~n. '~ The figures clearly show 
the immense growth in Sino-Japanese economic relations. The fact that 
China's exports to Japan exceeded US exports to Japan already in 2002 
also reflects this emerging dynamic bilateral trade.jO 
China's recent economic growth is comparable to the Japanese period 
of high growth in the 1960s. Investment flourishes from developed 
countries, making China 'the factory of the world'. Total trade nearly 
TABLE 1: Total Trade (Imports and Exports) between Japan and 
China,($ bn) 
1972 
1.1 
Source: Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO). (http://www.jetro.go.jp/jpn/ 
stats/ trade/excel/gaikyo2003.xls). 
1981 
10.4 
1991 
22.8 
2003 
132.4 
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doubled in the five years 1998-2002 with America, Japan, the EU and 
ASEAN (see Table 2). 
TABLE 2: China's Trade, 1998-2002 ($ bn) 
Year USA Japan EU 1 ASEAN411 I 
China took initiatives in 2000 to conclude a free trade agreement with 
ASEAN by the year 2010. All in all, recent Chinese politico-economic 
behaviour shows more engagement towards regional and global issues. 
These positive developments are primarily the result of efforts made by 
the Chinese themselves, although it must be acknowledged that Japan 
continued to encourage China in this direction. Koizumi is certainly 
aware of the importance of economic ties.53 
In contrast to these positive economic developments, political relations 
between Japan and China have registered considerable difficulties. There 
are numerous contributory factors to this problem, but I would like to 
concentrate on three dimensions which seem to be the most relevant, 
namely geopolitics, history and Taiwan. 
1. Geopolitics in Current Sino-Japanese Relations 
Turning first to the geopolitical context: China is on the ascendancy and 
for its economic development, it needs energy from all over the world. 
The most obvious way to ensure this is through its coastal areas. China's 
moves in its surrounding seas are obviously connected to this. Japan, 
on the other hand, which is becoming much more sensitive about the 
need to protect its people, territory and other rights in recent years, 
cannot to ignore China's maritime activities. An inevitable collision 
has therefore occurred. Two examples may be given: the East China 
Sea and Okinitorishima. 
In the seabed of the East China Sea lie rich resources, including 
an abundant supply of gas. These resources lie on both sides of the 
demarcation line of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as understood 
by Japan (equal distance from the borders). China's position on the EEZ 
differs (the continental shelf belongs to the coastal country), but since 
China has control over gas resources which Japan could not claim, it 
began preparations for their excavation many years ago. 
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Japan's anxiety became heightened that Chinese maritime research 
vessels were extending their activities into the Japanese EEZ. The two 
countries concluded an information sharing system in August 2000 (Togo 
2005: 154). But Japan learned in August 2004 that China unilaterally had 
begun to excavate the gas-field. The area itself cannot be contested by Japan, 
but Japan expressed its concern because the Chinese excavation might 
deplete Japan's gas, which may originate in the same gas-field. Successive 
requests by Japan for China to submit information about the state of the 
excavation have failed to elicit any response (AS, 24 October 2004). The 
excavation continues and irritation mounts on the Japanese side. 
Turning to the second example, Okinotorishima is a tiny 'island' 
located southeast of Okinawa, over which Japan has long claimed 
sovereignty, and on the basis of which Japan has defined its EEZ. In 
April 2004, China advanced its claim that, in accordance with the Law 
of the Sea, Okinotorishima should be considered as 'rocks', which do not 
entitle a country the right of an EEZ. Japan objected. No convergence of 
views was achieved and Chinese maritime research ships are scaling-up 
their activities around Okonotorishima (AS, 24 April 2004). 
From Japan's perspective, a series of other issues, including the build- 
up of Chinese naval strength and renewed interest in the Senkaku Islands, 
are fuelling the growing concern. There seem to be some justifications 
for the increasing rivalry. If a great power rises and another power in its 
vicinity is eager to reinstate its position in the region, certain tensions will 
naturally arise. This is a time-honoured conclusion of realism. In such a 
situation, each country is entitled to develop necessary and appropriate 
measures to respond to the other's power-plays, but both sides are 
expected to establish dialogue and exchanges to minimize possible 
conflict and the damage that might ensue, and to maximize possible 
rapprochement and its benefits. Illusory optimism does not help, but 
the reality of power-politics dictates that such governance of relations 
through dialogue and exchanges is in the interest of both parties. 
2. The Historical Factor in Current Sino-Japanese Relations 
Prime Minister Koizumi's succession of visits to the Yasukuni Shrine in 
August 2001, February 2002, January 2003 and January 2004 have doomed 
mutual visits by the heads of state to each other's capital for three years. 
In Japan a host of explanations have been advanced to explain Koizumi's 
continued visits: his political commitment before his election as prime 
minister;j%is need to secure votes from the lzokukai (families of the war 
dead); his determination not to 'bow to China', etc. 
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However, probably the most relevant factor behind the visits is that 
Koizumi genuinely believes in the importance of visiting this shrine: 
through praying for those who sacrificed their life for their country and 
mourning the war dead, he is convinced that he is redeeming Japan's 
'lost identity'. It is hard to detect anything militaristic or aggressive to- 
wards Asian neighbours. Koizumi is expressing with strong wording 
his remorse for the atrocities committed and is renewing his pledge for 
peace. For his statement made at the time of the first visit on 13 August 
2001, he was even harshly criticized by a nationalist opinion leader that 
his language has become even stronger than that used by Prime Minister 
Murayama: 'Koizumi even used hakarishirenai songai (immeasurable 
damage) instead of tadaino songai (tremendous damage)' (Maeno 2004: 
80). Although not appreciated at all by critical neighbours, he has so far 
consistently avoided 15 August as the visit date. 
But despite his best intention to mourn the war dead and his efforts 
to reach out to the other side, he has not gained any sympathy in China. 
One salient reason can be highlighted in this regard: Japan has never 
successfully explained how mourning its war dead at a shrine which 
also commemorates Class A war criminals does not contradict its ac- 
knowledged post-war remorse for its actions and its sincere desire for 
peace. Whatever the reason, the absence of summit talks with China in 
these critically important years of the latter's growth as a major regional 
and global player is a greatly missed opportunity and may harm Japan's 
national interests. The realpolitik necessity for governing the relationship 
and the constructivist urge for establishing identity are colliding with 
a seemingly impossible contradiction. Japan needs to find a way to 
redress this situation, both for the sake of its own national interests 
and in the interests of surrounding Asian countries. At the same time, 
the resolution also lies in reciprocal efforts and understanding by the 
surrounding international community. 
3. The Taiwan Issue 
Finally, let us turn to the third dimension of the Sino-Japanese context, 
viz. Taiwan. After Japan established relations with China in 1972, Japan 
severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan, though Taiwan remained 
one of Japan's most important economic partners. Up until 2000, Japa- 
nese exports to Taiwan exceeded its exports to China.55 The emergence 
of a strong Taiwanese identity under President Lee Teng-hui in 1996 
opened up a new debate in Japan on its policy towards China. In the 
latter half of the 1990s, Japanese politicians and intellectuals continued 
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to emphasize that Taiwan's identity is different from that of China's 
(Namiki 2004: 118-19), that Taiwan is a democratic country with which 
Japan shares common values (Kin 2004: 120-l), that Taiwan occupies 
a strategic position to protect sea-lanes that connect Japan and South- 
East Asia (Okazaki 2004: 117-18) and that Lee Teng-hui's praise of the 
positive aspects of Japanese colonial rule should be more appreciated 
(Nakajima 2004: 116-17). Anti-Chinese feeling often became mixed with 
pro-Taiwanese emotion. 
The Taiwan issue, which depends on how it is handled on both sides 
of the Strait, is an extremely difficult one. Since the establishment of 
diplomatic relations with China in 1972, Japan has committed itself to 
respecting the 'one-China' requesting only that the matter be 
resolved peacefully. The basic structure of the Japan-US Security Treaty 
from 1960 is also unambiguous. Taiwan is a part of the long-standing 
geographical definition of the Far East of Article 6 of the Security Treaty 
(Togo 2005: 83), where the United States has its security interest. Should 
the US decide to act, Japan must make up its mind through the prior 
consultation system. But more than three decades have passed since then 
and conditions on both sides of the Strait have changed, as has Japan's 
resolve to become a responsible partner of the international community. 
How this would affect Japan's position in cross-Strait relations is an 
extremely important and delicate matter. 
Japan observers abroad have naturally given a lot of attention to the 
increasing difficulties between Japan and China. Thomas Berger (2004: 
153-6), Michael Armacost (2003: 95-6), and Mike Mochizuki (2004: 121-5) 
all give detailed accounts about this difficulty, with a variety of degrees 
of optimism towards the future. As Mike Mochizuki points out, 'the key 
challenge for both Japanese and Chinese officials will be the management 
of populist nationalism in their respective countries' (Mochizuki 2004: 
124). But the root cause of the difficulty is probably more serious than 
any of these writings show. 
Ways Ahead 
Looking from the perspective of Japan's security and defence policy, 
the continuation of Koizumi's proactive and self-assertive policy will 
most likely lead to the question of revising the Constitution's Article 
9. In January 2000 a five-year parliamentary research commission was 
established in the House of Representatives. On 1 November 2002, 
the commission published an interim report showing the divergence 
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of views concerning the revision of Article 9 (AS, 2 November 2003). 
Traditional 'revisionists' of Article 9 like Yasuhiro Nakasone and a new 
generation of security-oriented deputies such as Shigeru Ishiba (LDP) 
and Seiji Maehara (Democratic Party) stated that revision was necessary 
to specify that Japan could exert not only the individual, but the collec- 
tive right to self-defence. The Komei Party, the Communist Party, and 
the Japan Socialist Party oppose revision of Article 9. The commission 
is scheduled to finalize its report in 2005. 
Prime Minster Koizumi, after he assumed power in April 2001, made 
it clear that constitutional revision, while not his immediate goal, was 
a viable long-term objective (AS, 31 August 2003). On 25 August 2003, 
Koizumi told reporters that he endorsed the Liberal Democratic Party 
formulating a proposal for revision by 2005 (AS, 26 August 2003). The 
idea originated among influential party members within the LDP: 
November 2005 will be the 50th anniversary of the Party. Taking these 
facts into account, one cannot rule out the possibility that constitutional 
revision will be placed on the political agenda in the years after 2005. 
But the revision of Article 9 inevitably leads to the state of Japan's 
relations with its Asian neighbours. Japan's decision to transform itself 
into a more responsible, proactive and self-assertive country should be 
understood and welcomed by other countries, particularly neighbouring 
countries. But the current state of political relations between Japan and 
its neighbours is far from satisfactory. One key difficulty is that the ra- 
tionale behind Japan's desire to re-establish its identity and overcome 
its past is poorly understood by its neighbours. 
There seem to be two major policy directions which should under- 
pin Japan's efforts in this regard. First, Japan's efforts to re-establish 
its identity should be conducted parallel with its efforts to understand 
other countries' pain over the same issue and to apologize for this. 'Japan 
should have two types of courage: to acknowledge and to apologize 
for the deeds which were wrong; [and] - to stand firm against wrong 
accusations and to defend her honour' (Togo 2005: 426). Second, Japan's 
search for its identity must always be framed in the overall perspective 
of the geopolitical power balance in East Asia. Fixation on a single factor, 
be it identity or otherwise, does not serve Japan's national interest. 
At the same time, efforts are required from the other side as well. Japan's 
neighbouring countries should show greater understanding of the nature 
of current Japanese policy, both towards a more responsible and proactive 
security policy and towards a search for its identity. Japan's neighbours 
should try to enlarge areas of co-operation for the sake of their own na- 
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tional interests and for the region more generally. Regional dialogue, as 
proposed by Thomas Berger (2003: 84), in which both sides genuinely try 
to understand the other, may offer the best hope for the future. 
Kazuhiko Togo is Lecturer and Research Fellozo at Princeton University. 
NOTES 
See also Mingst (2003: 76): 'identities change by engaging in co-operative behaviour 
and by learning' and Smith (2001: 224-49). 
Japan's Siberian intervention after the Russian revolution failed; the army was 
defeated by the Russians at Lake Khasan in 1938 and at Nomonhan in 1939. 
The occupation of Japan was undertaken by the Allied Forces, which consisted pri- 
marily of American forces, with a symbolic involvement of Commonwealth forces. 
Recent scholarly works indicate that the fundamental idea of idealistic pacifism was 
first proposed by then prime minister Kijyuuro Shidehara in his meeting with General 
MacArthur on 24 January 1946 (Iokibe 2001: 45). For the Japanese people, who had 
no knowledge of this meeting, Article 9 was taken to be an American notion. 
From February to March 1949, an American economist, Joseph Dodge, visited Japan 
and recommended a new policy to stabilize and stimulate the Japanese economy 
(Iokibe 2001: 61). 
Security forces (hoanfai) were established in October 1952, which developed into the 
Self-Defence Forces (SDF) in July 1954 (Ikei 1997, chronology). 
It was also called 'the system of the year 55'. 
Shigenori Togo is the author's grandfather. He left a memoir in Japanese Iidaino Ichi- 
men, translated into English and published by Simon & Schuster in 1955 entitled The 
Cause ofIapan. His activities are covered in my book as well (Togo 2005: 25-7,44-5). 
This expression is quoted from the title of a book written by Ryuichi Teshima, chief 
of the NHK office in Washington, on how Japan's reaction to the first Gulf War was 
confused, leading to non-appreciation of its efforts by the international community. 
See referred texts. 
In March 1996, Lee Teng-hui, a native Taiwanese who became the Kuomintang 
leader, was elected president. 
The Japan New Party led by Masahiro Hosokawa, the Sakigake (Harbinger) Party 
led by Masayoshi Takemura, and the Japan Renewal Party led by Ichiro Ozawa were 
the major ones. 
Already at the time of 'Japan's defeat in 19911, the three ruling parties, the LDP, the 
Komeito Party and the Japan Democratic Socialist Party, had agreed to enact a new 
law which would enable the SDF to participate in UN peacekeeping and humanitar- 
ian relief operations (Fukushima 1999: 69). 
Japan dispatched eight ceasefire observers, 600 construction troops, 75 civilian 
police officers, and 41 election observers to UNTAC (UN Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia) (http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/pko/kyoryoku.html, viewed 
on 4 December 2002). 
From March2002,680 SDF members to be engaged on facilities constructionand 10 com- 
manding officers were sent under UNTAET (UN Transitional Administration in East 
Timor). Their workcarried through to UNMISET (UN Mission of Support inEast Timor). 
(http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/pko/pdfs/jinteki.pdf, viewed on 5 August 
2003). 
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http://www.mofa.go.jp./mofaj/gaiko/pko/pdfs/jinteki.pdf, viewed on5 August 
2003. 
The first key defence policy document was the Basic Policy for National Defence 
adopted in 1957. The second document was the National Defence Program Outline 
(NDPO) adopted in 1976. That document was revised in 1995. 
http://www.mofa.go.jp./mofaj/gaiko/pko/pdfs/jinteki.pdf, viewed on 8 August 
2003. 
By 2002, 385 women in Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines and 78 women in the 
Netherlands received atonement. 
Miyazawa stated toward Korea in October 1990: 'deep remorse and apology', and 
in January 1992: 'heartfelt remorse and apology' (Togo 2005: 169-70). 
Hosokawa stated toward Korea in November 1993: 'deep remorse and heartfelt 
apology' (Togo 2005: 170), and toward China in March 1994: 'deep remorse and 
apology'. 
Murayama stated toward China in May 1995: 'deep remorse' (AS, 4 May 1995). 
Rikki Kersten, 'Ienaga Saburo and War Responsibility', public lecture organized by 
Japan-Dutch Dialogue, in Leiden on 10 May 2003. 
After becoming prime minister, Koizumi made a clear policy declaration in the 
spring of 2001 that the resolution of non-performing loans and the seven points of 
structural reform were major pillars of his economic policy. 
As described above, the long-time governance of the LDP under the 'system of the 
year 55' ended in 1993 with a non-LDP government. After the LDP returned to 
bower, the traditional system of factions based on power-sharing was weakened. 
In the 1990s the bureaucracy was shattered by a series of major scandals, involv- 
ing major ministries such as the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Welfare, the Defence Agency and the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. The bursting of the bubble economy naturally shook business, 
above all financial institutions and middle to small-scale enterprises. 
In 1991-92 there were eight rounds of negotiations to establish diplomatic relations; 
in 1995-97 the establishment of KEDO, Japan grants rice aid and the homecoming 
of former Japanese spouses; 1999-2000 three rounds of negotiations to establish 
diplomatic relations and continuing rice assistance. 
In 1993-94 occurred a nuclear crisis; 1998 the Taepodong missile-testing over Japa- 
nese islands; in 1999 a Maritime Safety Agency gunboat shot at unidentified vessels 
inside Japanese territorial waters; in 2001 another shooting of an unidentified vessel 
resulted in its explosion and sinking (AS, 24 December 2001). 
In March 1988, the Japanese government recognized in the Diet that 'there were 
enough doubts to suspect that three couples had been abducted by North Korea' 
(AS, 8 December 2002). Koizumi went to Pyongyang with a list of 11 abductees. 
See note 26. 
17 September 2002, signed by Junichiro Koizumi and Kim Jong I1 in Pyongyang. 
The Japanese prime minister's popularity is typically very low; the danger level is 
usually seen as being around 10 percent. 
Article 5 of the Security Treaty reads as follows: 'Each Party recognizes that an armed 
attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would 
be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the 
common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.' The 
expression 'constitutional provisions' refers to Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. 
http://www.emb-japan.~l/information2/statement/news4.htm, viewed on 9 No- 
vember 2001. 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/koizumispeech/2001/1029danwa.html, viewed on 14 
April 2003. 
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3"he 1999 Surrounding Situation Law provided a solid legal basis for the enactment 
of this new law against terrorism. The structures of the two laws are similar. The 
basic purpose of SDF activities differ: the Surrounding Situation Law prescribes 
SDF co-operation with US troops within the scope of the Japan-US security treaty, 
whereas the Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law prescribes Japan's co-operation 
against international terrorism, as defined by UN resolutions. 
35 Sankei Shinbun makes an interesting analysis comparing these divergent tendencies 
(Sankei Shinbun, 18 April 2004). 
36 The total number of soldiers deployed amounted to 1050. http://www2.asahi. 
com/special/iraqrecovery/images/040117b.gif, viewed on 5 July 2004. 
37 The three approved laws were related to (1) response to armed attack; (2) revision 
of a part of the SDF law; (3) revision of the law establishing the security committee. 
On 15 May the three laws were approved in the House of Representatives with ap- 
proximately 90 percent of votes in favour (AS, 16 May 2003). On 6 June they were 
approved in the House of Councillors with 202 deputies in support of the new laws 
among 235 present, with one abstention. The Communist Party and the Socialist 
Party were opposed (AS, 7 June 2003). 
38 The seven laws were related to: (1) the protection of Japanese nationals at a time of 
armed attack; (2) help and support for US forces; (3) control of maritime transport 
of foreign military equipment; (4) usage of specified public facilities; (5) handling 
of prisoners of war; (6) grave offences against international humanitarian law; 
and (7) revision of a part of the SDF laws. The three treaties were: (1) 1949 Geneva 
Convention Protocol I; (2) 1949 Geneva Convention Protocol 11; and (3) Revision 
of ACSA (httpo://www.jda.go.jp/j/yujihousei/index.htm). They were approved 
in the House of Representatives on 20 May (AS, 21 May 2004) and in the House of 
Councillors on 14 June 2004 (AS, 15 June 2004). 
39 The report also advised Japan to soften principles within the International Peace- 
keeping Law to attune them to evolving standards of international co-operation. 
'O One crude measure of calculating this imbalance is GNP ratio of over 12 to 1, $14 tril- 
lion to $1.14 trillion between the US and Japan vs China (calculated by the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs home page: http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/ecodata/gdp. 
html, viewed on 17 April 2005). See also Berger (2000: 408-20) and Katzenstein and 
Sil (2004: 20-6). 
" This statement is related to China but in my view applies to all countries in the 
region, North Korea inclusive, if abduction can be included with history. 
" These four islands-the Habomai group, Shikotan, Kunashiri and Etorofu-for- 
mally became a part of Japan when the border between Japan and Russia was first 
demarcated in 1855. The Soviet Union occupied them from the end of August to 
early September 1945 after Japan had capitulated. 
'3 Japan and the USSR resumed diplomatic relations in 1956. The Joint Declaration 
then adopted specified that two smaller islands (the Habomai group and Shikotan) 
would be transferred to Japan after the conclusion of the Peace Treaty, but Japan also 
insisted on the return of the two larger islands (Kunashiri and Etorofu). Since then, 
negotiations have turned around the issue of two (smaller) versus four (including 
the two larger). 
" In 1998 Japan proposed to demarcate the border between Etorofu and Uruppu, 
while making maximum concessions on all outstanding issues. No further details 
are disclosed by the negotiators, but Minoru Tamba, the deputy minister of foreign 
affairs, who assisted the negotiations between Hashimoto and Yeltsin, wrote in his 
memoir that Yeltsin was genuinely attracted to the proposal (Tamba 2004: 66). 
'j In 1960 when Japan revised the Security Treaty with the US, the USSR denied its 
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obligation to transfer the two smaller islands until all foreign troops had been with- 
drawn from Japan. 
" This information is based on the author's conversation with an informed Japanese 
source, who asked not to be identified (18 November 2004). 
" Mr. Jenkins, the husband of Mrs. Soga, is an American deserter, and refused to 
go back to Japan for fear of American prosecution. On 9 July the Soga family was 
reunited in Indonesia, and on 18 July returned to Japan (AS, 2 July 2004). 
The total number of abductees as identified by the government is now 15. 
" The figures in the table and in this sentence derive from the Japan External Trade 
Organization (JETO) website. Statistics are based on Japanese figures. (http://www. 
jetro.go.jp/jpn/stats/trade/excel/gaikyo2003.xls, viewed on 8 January 2005). 
j0 In 2002, China's exports to Japan were $61.6 billion whereas US exports to Japan 
were $57.6 billion. Although outside the scope of this analysis, China, together with 
Hong Kong, became the number one trading partner for Japan exceeding the US in 
the year of 2004. 
'l These are Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia. 
'' JETRO calculated this figure primarily based on IMF statistics. (http://www:jetro. 
go.jp/ec/j/econ/data/matrixl998xls-2002x1s, viewed on 6 July 2004.) 
j3 Koizumi stated that he was not worried by Japan's stalled political relationship with 
China because it was overshadowed by flourishing economic ties (Financial Times, 
7 June 2004). 
'"oizumi had promised 43 times in his pre-election campaign that he was going to 
visit Yasukuni on 15 August when elected as prime minister (Maeno 2004: 79) 
j5 http://www.jetro.go.jp/ec/j/trade/excel/rank.xls, viewed on 6 July 2004. 
j6 The Japanese government position was determined in Article 3 of the 1972 Japan- 
China Joint communiqu6, which reads: 'The Government of the People's Republic 
of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's 
Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this 
stand of the Government of the People's Republic of China, and it firmly maintains 
its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation.' Article 8 of the Potsdam 
Proclamation states that 'The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out' 
and the Cairo Declaration states that '...Formosa (Taiwan). . .shall be restored to the 
Republic of China'. 
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